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SURROGACY: THE CASE FOR FULL CONTRACTUAL
ENFORCEMENT
RichardA. Epstein *
INTRODUCTION: EVERYTHING'S SPECIAL

M

OST work in law and economics is not concerned with the
visceral issues of flesh and blood. Thus it is common for
scholars in the tradition to examine the optimal measure of damages in contract disputes, or to develop models that allow for the
efficient trading of options and futures-issues that are critical to
the vigorous operation of society, but which attract little passion
and debate save from those who are already deeply committed to
the specialized enterprises they study. When the discussion
switches to questions of family law, the nature and interest of the
participants and audience typically changes, and radically so. Virtually everyone has some deep-seated belief on how the fundamental institutions of social life should be organized, and virtually
everyone brings to social questions profound moral and religious
convictions that cut close to the quick and define their personal
identity. So deep do these issues run that it is difficult for them (as
it is for me)' to gain any kind of intellectual distance from these
powerful precommitments. The narrative tradition is strong in
both conservative and liberal quarters. One striking piece of evidence is how many papers on this subject are cast in the narrative
mode, whereby the authors reveal something of their own personal
situation in order to set the stage for the remarks that follow.' I am
not immune from these pressures, for my experiences with fertility
work have given me a certain sympathy for couples who have
decided to try the surrogacy route as a last measure of desperation.
Yet, as difficult as it is, intellectual progress in these hotly disputed areas depends on the ability to resist the temptation to sus* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
I would like to thank Ann Shuman for her detailed and careful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
1 See, e.g., Barbara B. Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings:
Discerning Parenthood in Irrational Action, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2493, 2495-99 (1995).
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pend the ordinary rules of evaluation because of the intuitive pull
of the substantive questions. Indeed, one of the greatest intellectual failures of modem public debate is the routine assumption that
special problems require special solutions, usually ones that call for
some form of government intervention into the operation of markets. Thus the early regulation of labor markets derived strength
2
from the proposition that "labor" was not an article of commerce.
But this rhetorical flourish did not lead to a world in which labor
was neither bought nor sold. Instead it granted unions an exemption from the antitrust laws, legalizing worker cartels. In housing
markets, the rhetoric for rent control usually starts from the same
premise.3 Shelter is special and hence its price should be regulated
by sitting tenants (who then use their voting power in local elections to reap below-market rents at the expense of landlords and
potential tenants). Similarly, the Clinton Health Security Act went
astray because it started from the proposition that life and death
issues require special and distinctive rules for the provision of
health care.4 Yet if the Clinton proposals had been enacted into
law, the consequences would have been rather different from those
envisioned by its proponents: a National Health Plan would have
created a vast and impersonal bureaucracy to restrict entry, to
divide markets, to regulate prices, and to breed hidden cross-subsidies. So by accretion the toll quickly adds up. Everything turns
out to be special, which is to say that nothing is special at all.
The emotive force of the word "special" works to displace the
operation of markets with some system of state regulation. If ever
there were an obvious candidate for "special" status, the structure
of the family and the interactions of its members are it. Yet once
again that label marks the first step down the road to government
bans and state control. One obvious target of regulation concerns
the addition of new members to an ongoing family. The obvious
and preferred form of expanding a family is through ordinary procreation, which responds to our most powerful social and biological
imperatives. But that option is not open to some couples: where
2 See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1988)).
3 For an illustration of the philosophical mischief associated with this position, see
Margaret J. Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 350, 352 (1986).
4 See Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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the husband is infertile, artificial insemination allows the woman to
carry the child to term in a relatively noncontroversial fashion. But
matters are not so simple when women are rendered infertile by a
variety of diseases or conditions, or are able to carry a child to term
only by exposing themselves or their offspring to grave danger.
Faced with this problem, adoption is one alternative, albeit for
many couples an imperfect one, and one that in any event is highly
regulated by the state.5 One method to circumvent the senseless
and intrusive inquiries that social workers often make in adoption
cases is simply to "purchase" a baby from its natural parents (usually, but by no means always, the biological mother) for cold hard
cash. But that alternative precludes the opportunity for any
genetic connection between either parent and the offspring. Surrogacy contracts offer a means to supply that genetic connection, at
least on the father's side. In the standard form of surrogacy contracts, the sperm of the biological father is used to impregnate the
designated female surrogate, and the resulting offspring becomes
by contract the exclusive child of its biological father, later to be
adopted by his spouse. More recently, advanced technology has
allowed some surrogacy arrangements to take a more sophisticated
turn: under full surrogacy contracts, the fertilized egg of the married couple is inserted into the uterus of the surrogate mother and
carried to term by a woman who has no (necessary) genetic connection with the offspring.6
The key question about these surrogacy contracts is whether
either or both forms should be enforced and respected by the state,

5 New Jersey law, for example, requires that all adoptions involve a voluntary surrender
of the child to a state-approved agency, NJ. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-14 (West 1993), and it
prohibits the use of consideration (e.g., cash or other things of value) in adoption. N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 9:3-54(a) (West 1993). Both of these provisions were invoked to deny the
enforceability of the surrogate contract in In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). Not all
state courts have refused to enforce surrogacy arrangements. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (enforcing the surrogacy contract and denying any rights to the
surrogate mother).
6 In these cases one question is whether the state will recognize the woman whose egg
led to conception as the parent of the child. See, e.g., Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 767
(Ohio C.P. 1994) where, in a friendly action, the court ordered that the birth certificate list

as the mother the woman who furnished the egg, and not her sister who carried it to term.
Amen. Contractual enforcement between the parties was not involved in this transaction.
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or whether there is something special (and degrading7 ) about these
contracts that makes them proper objects for prohibition, or at
least for stringent forms of regulation: the imposition of extensive
physiological and psychological testing of potential surrogates is
but one of many possible approaches. Many writers have urged
that bans and criminalization are too harsh a sanction and have
claimed that the proper approach is to render these contracts unenforceable by the biological father against the surrogate, at least
before the child is handed over pursuant to the contract. 8
For my own part, I think that total bans and half-measures illustrate the pattern of mistake that has been repeated so often on
matters of work, housing and health. The situations that prompt
the use of surrogacy contracts are by definition extraordinary, but
in and of itself that hardly marks them out for a regime of state
regulation. Rather, the distinctive nature of these relationships is
best captured in the way surrogacy contracts are drafted, not by the
legal rules of prohibition or regulation. It is quite evident that the
purchase of a child (or more accurately, parental rights over a
child-a big difference!) is different from the purchase of a bottle
of vinegar or a package tour of the wine-country-which is why the
contracting process for surrogates, and the terms of a surrogacy
contract, take on a form that is radically different from the ordinary contract of sale for a fungible good or service. Like most
transactions it is a bit of both. 9 The important task is first to understand the motivations of the parties to these transactions, as a window into contract formation and contract terms. Once these
elements are exposed, then I think that the case for full enforcement of these contracts is fully defensible, notwithstanding the
urgent pleas for their unenforceability, regulation or prohibition.
7 The word is not mine. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 175
(1993) ("These degrading failures of respect and consideration on the part of the surrogate
industry are of concern to the state, because they are embodied in relations of domination
that deny surrogate mothers their autonomy."). For an examination of both the autonomy
and the domination claims, see infra text accompanying notes 35-36.
8 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 Yale Li. 293, 336
(1988) (arguing that a father's relationship with his child is weaker than that of the woman
who carried the baby, and is thus less deserving of legal enforcement); Martha A. Field,
Surrogate Motherhood 75-83, 97-109 (1988) (discussing the enforceability of surrogacy
agreements under contract law).
9 This is a point often ignored by the opponents of surrogacy contracts. See the
discussion of specific performance, infra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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From a theoretical point .of view, however, it is important to
avoid an ad hoc inquiry. Thus, it is a mistake to approach any subject, from health care to surrogacy, on the assumption that it stands
on its own bottom. Instead what is needed is a more comprehensive theory that offers some overall assessment of the strength and
weaknesses of a system of voluntary exchange. Once that theory is
developed in a general form, it can then be applied to particular
transactions. In some cases the claims for regulation will be borne
out by showing that the basic conditions necessary for a successful
regime of market transactions have not been satisfied. Yet it may
well be that the opposite conclusion is true: while the conditions
for .voluntary exchange are far from perfect, no feasible system of
regulation is able to improve on them. So in this Article I propose
to take the long way round to the full enforcement position on surrogacy. In the next Part I ask when and why systems of strong
property rights are desirable, why these systems normally carry
with them the rights of exchange and alienation on terms that the
parties see fit, and why the principled limitations on freedom of
alienation do not apply in surrogacy cases. In one sense the fundamental observation of the model is that gains to the contracting
parties are social gains that cannot be ignored even if other costs,
and other benefits, have to be taken into account. Those gains
therefore deserve to be included in any overall assessment of the
soundness of the contracting practice.
Within this framework, three types of objections might be plausibly offered to counteract the case for full contractual enforcement.
The first of these examines defects in the bargaining process that
could undermine the mutual gain assumption; the second looks to
questions of adverse external effects on third parties that are not
taken into account by the contracting parties; and the third looks to
questions of coordination, freeriding and holdout that often lead to
the underproduction of public goods. In addition to these standard
concerns of the law and economics tradition, it is also necessary to
confront concerns that arise outside of it: matters of commodification, matters of incommensurability, and matters of inequality of
bargaining power, gender inequality and social symbolism. 10 Once
10 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 7, at 168 ("I will argue that contract pregnancy
commodifies both women's labor and children in ways that undermine the autonomy and
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these areas are covered, the last Part of the Article will then
examine some of the particular provisions of surrogacy contracts,
including those terms that are most often held up to hostile criticism, in order to show that the condemnations of these provisions
proceed not from an understanding of the nature and context of
the surrogate transaction but rather from a rigid misapplication
and misunderstanding of contract doctrine.
I.

THE LOGIC OF ALIENATION AND EXCHANGE

The first task is to examine the role that alienation plays in ordinary markets. That inquiry is necessary to set the stage for a discussion of surrogacy, and the practices with which it is often
compared: baby-selling and organ sales (as distinguished from voluntary donations). Any system of markets depends for its operation on a well-articulated system of property rights. Unless it is
known who is the owner of a particular resource-human, physical
or material-it cannot be determined who is entitled to use, sell or
otherwise dispose of the property or thing. If I could occupy the
house you built, why should you build it in the first place? If I
could sell the house you occupy, what then is the position of my
buyer who wishes to move in when you will not move out? Even if
the buyer forced his way in, what is to prevent someone else from
selling the house out from under him, setting the stage for yet
another ugly confrontation? Any alienation of property (which
includes all forms of transfer-sale, mortgage, gift, bequest, loanwith or without conditions) must be made by its owner. Similarly
any sale of human labor must be made by the person whose labor
will be used. The separation of use from exchange rights is manifestly unstable and counterproductive."
This brief account of the right of alienation begs one important
question. Alienation, if it should take place, should be executed by
the owner of the resource in question. But why allow any alienadignity of women and the love parents owe to children."). For an effective counterattack
on Anderson's position, from which I have learned much, see Richard J. Arneson,
Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 132, 139-40, 154-55
(1992).
11 For my defense of this general framework, see Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain
Alienation?, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 970 (1985), which did not extend to the issues discussed
here.
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tion, or some particular forms of alienation-gift not sale, sale not
gift-at all?' 2 The point has been debated from ancient times to
the present. Aristotle, for example, in his Politics is at many critical points a strong defender of a system of private property, and for
reasons that we would regard as quite modem: "Property should
be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for,

when every one has a distinct interest, men will not complain of
one another, and they will make more progress, because every one
will be attending to his own business.' 3 His explanation for that
preference is again familiar: property that is common to all is
tended after by none, for none are able to obtain a return from the
labor that they invest in it. 14 The private nature of the property
thus secures the investment in question. Yet Aristotle's qualified
defense of private property does not carry with it a parallel defense
of market exchange. In some sense his position rings odd to the

modem ear, as so much of Anglo-American property law is
devoted to preserving the alienability of property as an inherent
condition of the fee simple.' 5 Modem statutes often condemn
restraints on alienation as "repugnant" to the fee simple or some

lesser interest.' 6 In contrast, a caution about property is found in
Aristotle, for his defense of private property in large measure rests
upon two conceptions. The first is the ethical imperative of selfsufficiency, and the second is the belief in the primacy of productive labor that transforms the materials of the earth into useful

12 For a general discussion of the theory of inalienability, see Margaret J. Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 931 (1985).
13Aristotle, Politics 1263a25-29 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1943).
14

Id.

See A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law (2d ed. 1986).
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 711 (West 1982) ("Conditions restraining alienation, when
repugnant to the interest created, are void."). The proposition implies that some such
conditions have this characteristic, even when created by a voluntary transaction. The
judicial gloss created on the provision has taken the line that a "strong presumption" is
established against the restraint on alienation. This gloss was applied with disastrous
consequences in the "due-on-sales" clause context in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 582
P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978). In Wellenkamp the court invalidated these clauses with respect to
existing mortgages, such that lenders were forced to keep low interest loans in place after
the sale of the underlying property even though the low yields pushed them to the brink of
bankruptcy or over it.
15
16
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objects. In this world, market exchanges offend both these values,
which leads Aristotle to condemn them as "unnatural" acts. 7
Aristotle's point of view shows that it is quite possible to regard
rights of exchange as fully separable from rights of possession and
use. To use the modem phrase, the alienability of property seems
to be a contestable concept. But why should a separation between
possession and use on the one side, and alienation on the other
side, take place? Aristotle's conception is again suggestive of the
problem: he sees that in market exchanges each side "exploits" the
weaknesses of the other. It is as though both parties become worse
off, and are degraded by the exchange.
Within a moral framework, his point is that there are some
exchanges that could be regarded as pandering, corrupt or degenerate, even though both sides regard themselves as better off as a
result of the transaction in question. Few would dispute this conclusion. But Aristotle's condemnation of the retail trade goes far
beyond settings where admission is charged to enter peep shows,
for it covers the exchange of all goods and services. Aristotle, and
the modem critics of exchange, pose two critical questions. The
first asks, in which direction should the presumption lie? Do we
set the presumption in favor of exchange or against it? Do we, in
other words, believe that exchange promotes human welfare or
that it degrades human dignity? The second question is, what
should be done with the insight that at least some exchanges do not
meet our highest collective moral instincts? Aristotle himself was
free and easy with the condemnation "unnatural" for a huge range
of individual actions, and he did not trouble himself much with
deciding whether the proper response to these unnatural acts
17 For a general discussion of market transactions, see Aristotle, Politics, supra note 13,
.at 1256b40-1258b8. The passage ends as follows:
There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household
management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honourable, while
that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by
which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest
reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural
object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at
interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is
applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent.
Wherefore of all modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural.
Id. at 1258a40-1258b8.
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should be mere disapproval or legal prohibition and regulation.
But it is quite clear that he did not wish to ban all exchanges, for he
also has an extensive discussion about the advantages of money
(and sale) over barter. 18
The answers to these two questions do much to shape the overall
nature of the general inquiry. As to the first, the safer presumption
by far is that people know their own interest well and that contracts usually are mechanisms to achieve mutual gain, not mutual
exploitation (or one-sided exploitation). The tradition of subjective value states that each person has and may act on his own conception of the good, and may surrender that which is of less value
to him in exchange for something that he values even more. There
is no external ruler that will tell individuals whether they have
given too much for the things they have acquired in exchange.
Where both parties have engaged voluntarily in a transaction, there
is the prospect of mutual gain, which is what makes people so eager
to seek out contractual opportunities in the first place. Any theory
of value that places the entire retail trade at risk does no better a
job in explaining the norms of ancient societies than it does in
describing our own. Production does not take place in a vacuum,
and self-sufficient individuals who seek to do and make everything
for themselves end up losing all the benefits from the division of
labor. Ironically, therefore, they embark upon a course of action
that usually requires healthy subsidies from others to maintain
their "self-sufficient" ways of life. The strong presumption therefore should be set in favor of voluntary exchange, even as we recognize that some transactions count as mutually voluntary yet also
mutually degrading. The traditional "morals" head of the police
power captures that view on, for example, such issues as prostitution.' 9 Yet in the grand scheme of things a prohibition on voluntary exchange for these moral reasons should be narrowly
circumscribed.
An inquiry into their legality, however, does not exhaust the full
range of responses to activities that meet with moral disapproval.
It is still possible to speak out against transactions that one would
18

Id. at 1257a5-42.

19 For an account of the "morals" head of the police power, see Ernst Freund, The

Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights chs. 7-9 (1904).
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not ban. No one should take the position that it is impermissible to
urge people to avoid entering into legal transactions. The separation of law and morals is not a reason for regret but rather is an
important feature of any free society. We respect the right of individuals to do things that offend others, but we expose them to criticism for doing those things, without imposing legal sanctions for
their mistakes. Everyone therefore is at some risk of criticism, but
still keeps the power of choice over his own personal affairs.
The basic legal presumption should be set therefore in favor of
voluntary exchange. The next question is, what reasons must be
advanced to, overcome that basic presumption? Here the first
source of concern is the process whereby the agreement itself is
formed. Thus all legal systems recognize that contracts procured
by force, duress, fraud or misrepresentation cannot. be enforced if
still executory, and may, under appropriate circumstances, be set
aside even after performance. The source of this prohibition seems
clear: the mutual gain hypothesis cannot survive when any of these
invalidating conditions are present. At the very best, the outcome
of the conduct has one winner and one distinct loser. That outcome might (barely) be acceptable under Kaldor-Hicks notions of
efficiency if there were reasons to believe that the size of the gains
dwarfed the size of the losses. 20 But it is wholly indefensible when
the size of the loss exceeds the size of the gain. In practice we may
not know for any tainted transaction the relative magnitudes of
gains and losses.2 But we do know this: in those cases where the
gain to the winner exceeds the costs to the loser, a voluntary transaction without the taint can usually be arranged, so that both sides
are indeed better off. Yet the parties could not formulate any successful voluntary transaction where total losses exceed total gains:
there is just not enough that the winner could pay the loser and still
20 Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency the winners receive enough so that they could
compensate the losers, even if in fact they do not do so. See Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 12-16 (4th ed. 1992).
21 In other cases we are confident about the needed information on relative value. The
usual case of necessity allows individuals to enter and use the property of another person,
for no one wants to contend that the value of a dock in a storm to a drowning man is less
than the value to the owner of having it lay vacant. So the law dispenses with the need for
consent to enter, but imposes a duty to compensate on the user of the property, so as to
return again to the mutual gain condition. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124
N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
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gain from the transaction himself. Forcing persons to conduct their
affairs in the "right" way therefore weeds out those suspect transactions and leaves in place only those transactions that result in net
social improvement. Conditions of this sort could, and should, be
attached to every voluntary transaction, including those which
involve surrogacy or its "kindred" transactions, such as babyselling.
The second constraint on voluntary transactions addresses their
effects on third persons. In considering this question of externalities, there is an all-too-common sense today that virtually all externalities will be negative: the persons who are not parties to
voluntary transactions will necessarily be hurt by them. Assuming
for the moment-but only for the moment-that this is true, then
the following dilemma is posed: the external losses could be either
greater or lesser than the gains to the contracting parties. Yet typically the ability to enter into a voluntary transaction with these
third parties is highly limited because it is so difficult to identify
them, much less to figure out appropriate levels of compensation.
As a rough rule of thumb, the legal response should be to ban or
restructure those transactions whose negative third-party consequences outweigh the gains to the transacting parties. Once again
gains and losses are measured by a compensation criterion: could
the contracting parties buy out all the parties who suffer negative
externalities and still have some gain left over for themselves to
share? Stated in this unrestricted form, the vaunted institution of
voluntary exchange seems to hang by a fingernail. After all, there
are millions of persons who could be hurt by any transaction to
which they are not parties; yet there are only two, or at least very
few, parties to that transaction who gain from it. Any comparison
of transactional gains to negative externalities alone, therefore,
heavily biases the inquiry against contractual validity. Clearly
something is amiss if external losses dwarf contractual gains.
The missing piece of the puzzle is that many transactions routinely generate positive externalities that have to be added into the
social ledger as well. Thus in the simple case in which A and B are
able to increase their wealth and utility by voluntary exchange,
they offer more opportunities for third persons to sell their services
or their wares, more opportunities for third persons to raise funds
for charitable purposes. In practice the working assumption should
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be set in favor of voluntary exchange: the increased satisfaction of
the parties creates an excess of positive over negative externalities,
such that some clear showing of large negative externalities is
needed to defeat a voluntary transaction. That burden is not
impossible to meet: contracts to murder third persons, and even
contracts in restraint of trade, have systematic negative effects on
third parties. Do any negative externalities from surrogacy contracts reach that level, or even come close to it?
Finally, contractual regimes may be insufficient to provide for
the public goods-roads, defense, courts-required in any wellordered society. Here is not the place to recite the usual litany of
holdout problems, coordination games and prisoner's dilemmas.
All those complications arise only in cases where private parties
are unable to enter into the contracts needed to achieve their ends.
To overcome these difficulties, the well-ordered state taxes all to
benefit all, ideally in equal proportion. But neither surrogacy nor
baby-selling raise any coordination problems worth speaking
about. These transactions, which involve a small number of parties, can be facilitated by a group of eager intermediaries. The
transactions do take place, even in a hostile environment. Surely
their pace would increase in a more hospitable legal environment.
The key challenges to a contractual regime therefore are restricted
to the first two points: the risks these contracts hold as between the
contracting parties, and their external effects (positive and negative) on third parties. It is to those issues that we now turn in the
specific context of surrogacy contracts.
A.

Transactionsas Between the Parties

The initial question is how large do risks of transactional breakdown loom as between the parties? My own conclusion is that
these problems do not offer any serious argument for the prohibition or regulation of surrogacy arrangements. Of course, surrogacy
contracts differ from contracts for the sale of fine wine or fast cars.
Surrogacy involves the creation of a new human being with claims
against his parents. That insight, however, is hardly lost on the parties to a surrogate transaction, who are alert to the ensuing complications right off the bat. This knowledge, moreover, shapes the
practices that lead up to the formation of a surrogacy contract in
ways that reduce the risk of transactional breakdown. In ordinary
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markets, the seller of a commodity is usually willing to sell the
goods to the first person who can pay for them. Go to any checkout line in America, and see if the cashier cross-examines the buyer
on his qualifications to cook a pound of meat or assemble a lawn
sprinkler. The only relevant question is, cash, check or credit card?
No surrogacy contract takes such a casual form. In the first
place, the sharp opposition between buyer and seller is blurred in
the surrogacy context. Of course the cash payment goes from the
father (and his spouse) to the surrogate. But his sperm, and with it
his obligations of parenthood, go with it. The purchased "product"
does not appear in a cellophane wrapping or a tin can; all parties
have a deep concern about the health and well-being of the baby
who will be born from this contract. That concern translates into a
careful and extensive selection process to find those women who
are most likely to be able to deliver a healthy baby at term. Similarly, potential surrogate mothers, like parents placing infants for
adoption, want to select suitable parents for the babies to whom
they give birth. It is very clear that no sane couple would entrust
their surrogacy arrangement to a woman who has a history of alcohol and drug abuse, who has nagging health problems, who is
unable to care for herself in relative comfort, or who has already
experienced complications in delivering her own children.
The acquiring couple therefore have an intimate interest in the
condition and conduct of the surrogate mother, which leads to the
most important maxim about partnerships and other forms of relational contracts. The most important decision is with whom the
contract is made: specific terms are critical but they occupy a
subordinate role insofar as they are designed to see that midcourse
regrets do not send the arrangement off the rails.22 That focus on
selection, moreover, helps protect against diffuse concerns of
exploitation and advantage that could lead to fraud and other
forms of sharp practice. The last thing that an acquiring couple
wants is a surrogate whose misbehavior could harm the child.
Their interest is in choosing a woman able to fend for herself. It is
not in their interest to find a woman whom they can exploit. That
vested interest in the health and the welfare of the surrogate
mother in turn helps protect against the manifold forms of con22

See infra Part IV.
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tracting abuse. In the event that some abuse does take place, all
the standard legal remedies for fraud and misrepresentation are
available to the surrogate mother as a matter of course.
Knowledge of those risks again influences the way in which the
process is carried out. No matter what the background legal rule,
no one will (as no one has) believe that caveat emptor is the appropriate rule for surrogacy contracts. Instead, wholly without regulation, the norms of disclosure dominate. The terms and conditions
of the relationship can be fully explained; independent counselors
and advisers can be brought in to explain the situation to the
potential surrogate. Many women choose to become surrogate
mothers on more than one occasion, while those who are first-time
surrogates can be encouraged to speak to other women who have
gone through the experience before they sign on the dotted line.
The need for these precautions, or at least some of them, should be
quite apparent to contracting parties, making it quite dangerous to
pile on additional restrictions, whose major purpose is typically to
stymie the transaction under the guise of supplying full information
to the potential surrogate.
The common concerns about exploitation of the surrogate
mother are then effectively countered by the social institutions and
legal doctrines that surround these transactions. We cannot even
appeal to the misguided picture of the giant corporation working
mischief on the hapless consumer. It is therefore not surprising to
see the opposition to surrogate motherhood coalesce around other
issues. Quite commonly the debate hones in on the question of
status: the mere fact that the woman chooses to enter into such a
contract shows that she occupies a subordinate sphere and has
allowed herself to become debased, or at least exploited, by the
biological father, and perhaps his wife as well.
Once again, however, a bit of perspective is required. Suppose
that one takes the Aristotelian view and believes, first, that certain
voluntary exchanges are inconsistent with the "natural desires" of
the parties, and, second, that the state should intervene to prevent
these transactions from taking place. What kinds of transactions
might conceivably fall within that class? From an Aristotelian
point of view the cardinal virtue would be moderation, so that
transactions that smack of various forms of excess-gluttony, cruelty, indiscriminate sexual dalliances-might all be condemned
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under such a standard. Prostitution also might easily be condemned on such a view.
But surrogate mother contracts? Here it takes little imagination
to realize that these contracts are not born of momentary excesses
or transient and base desires. No one thinks that surrogate
arrangements are a first choice. They are a desperate last hope,
often for couples who have tried for years to conceive without success, often taking Progesterone and Provera in order to stimulate
ovulation (which carries with it the risk of multiple pregnancy and
a host of unpleasant side effects). Other women have had multiple
miscarriages during pregnancy. Still other women have endured
multiple operations to eliminate endometriosis or to unblock Fallopian tubes, only to fail to conceive after spending thousands of dollars. As Richard Arneson has written, none of the many writers
who attack the legitimacy of surrogate mother contracts show the
slightest empathy for the plight of the woman who wants her husband to participate in a surrogate relationship.23 Yet once any
weight is given to the sense of frustration and quiet desperation
that drives couples to a surrogacy decision, how could one condemn the transaction on the ground that it glorifies base instincts
and practices?
Nor can one condemn surrogacy transactions by looking at the
position of the surrogate. As Lori Andrews and others have
pointed out, the motivations for becoming a surrogate mother are
many and diverse.24 In some cases it is a straightforward calculation that the income received from the process justifies the emotional sacrifices that are necessarily required. In other cases the
motivations are mixed. Some money is accepted by a surrogate
who empathizes with the plight of the married couple with whom
she has contracted. The context may be novel but the set of mixed
motivations is familiar. At some level it is akin to the motivation
of the man who sells his $2000 car to the couple next door for half
See Arneson, supra note 10, at 145-48.
See Lori Andrews, Between Strangers: Surrogate Mothers, Expectant Fathers, &
Brave New Babies 68-73 (1989); Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge
for Feminists, 16 Law Med. & Health Care 72, 76 (1988). Professor Andrews makes the
same point with great power in her comments on my paper. See Lori B. Andrews, Beyond
Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 Va. L. Rev.
23

24

2343, 2353-54 (1995).
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price to help them out in a rough patch. There is little sense of
exploitation and a clear recognition of what is done and why it is
done. Once again the surrogate should be praised for her actions,
not condemned by those who disagree with her motives. The same
narrative tradition which normally cautions us to understand transactions before condemning them surely applies to this case if it
applies to any. Those women who choose to become surrogates do
not need our protection against their own weaknesses of judgment
or will.
B.

External Effects

At this point, the inquiry switches to the second line of attack:
may these transactions be invalidated because they produce
adverse effects on third parties? The examples of contracts to kill
third persons and contracts to rig bids show that this class of cases
is not empty. The issue is whether the surrogacy contract falls
within its scope. Here there is little or no concern about market
structure or monopoly power, so there is no reason to worry about
monopoly. The point of departure therefore is the contract to kill
or maim a third person. The question is whether the adverse
impact, if any, on the unborn child should be treated as falling in a
same or similar class of cases.
Simply to state the comparison is to show its extravagance. The
main point goes to the direction of the anticipated effect. How
many people enter into surrogacy contracts in order to hurt the
newly conceived child? If anything, exactly the opposite is to be
expected. The people who have struggled so hard to conceive their
own child are probably the best candidates to be good parents and
not the worst. It hardly seems likely that a couple that endured so
much grief to have its own child would embark on a course of
abuse and neglect with a surrogate child. Elizabeth Anderson
claims that the first obligation of a parent is unconditional love of a
child.2 5 Would that all parents showed that to their own children.
2s Anderson, supra note 7, at 170 ("The most fundamental obligation of parents to their
children is to love them. Children are not to be used or manipulated by their parents for
personal advantage."). But there can be as much, or as little, love of a child from surrogacy
as a child from adoption or foster care. It is one thing to believe that parents must take
into account the interests of their child, but quite inconceivable to think that they must
always neglect their own. Parents differ from ordinary trustees in that they are allowed to
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But is there any reason to think that parents by surrogacy would
not love the children whom they obtain by this arrangement? Of
course the risks here are not zero, and one should not assume that
this is the case. But by the same token the appropriate baseline for
an unacceptable risk of harm to the child is not zero. After all,
children conceived by normal means often run a far greater risk of
abuse. There is surely a risk of abuse even in apparently stable
families. The risk is greater for children born of troubled marriages that end in divorce, and still greater for illegitimate children,
especially if the mother's new boyfriend moves in.26 In these cases,
we do not think that the risk of harm to children constitutes a powerful reason to license, limit, or ban procreation: it seems hard to
believe that these concerns rise to this level in a surrogacy context.
Let us assume for the moment, however, that some risk of abuse
remains. Even so, prohibition is not the remedy that fits the
offense. The prohibition of surrogacy contracts operates ex ante,
and falls upon innocent and guilty alike, making no effort to weed
out high-risk surrogacy situations while allowing good ones to survive. At the very least the law should seek to find a filter that
would accomplish the needed separation. I have little or no confidence in the states' ability to screen those couples seeking parental
rights either by adoption or surrogacy. The process surely would
take into account their own interests just as they must take into account the interests of
their children. There is a level of built-in conflict that is just not present in routine financial
situations. For a somewhat different view of the trustee/parent comparison, see Elizabeth
S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401 (1995).
26 No great research is needed to support these points. But here are two items picked
up from a casual search of the Sunday newspapers: "A 10-year-old South Side boy was in
critical condition Saturday after being set afire, allegedly by his mother's boyfriend, who
police said was upset because he believed the child had stolen about $20 worth of food
stamps." Teresa Puente, Boy Set Afire Over Missing Food Stamps, Chi. Trib., Mar. 26,
1995, § 2, at 1.
And more generally, a letter to the New York Times by Esther Wattenberg, a professor
in the School of Social Work at the University of Minnesota, noted that it is false to assume
that children are taken away from their parents "only because they are poor." Indeed, the
"blunt truth is that even with these hazardous situations [parental alcoholism, drug
addiction, and other disabilities] for children, only a small portion, where 'imminent harm'
can be demonstrated, are accepted for investigation and possibly for services." Esther
Wattenberg, Child Welfare System, Under Fire, Staggers On, N.Y. Tmes, Mar. 26, 1995,
§ 4, at 14.
27 Thus one thinks of the unmarried man who entered into a surrogacy contract only to
kill the child after assuming parental obligations. See Tamar Lewin, Man Accused of
Killing Son Borne by a Surrogate Mother, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1995, at A16.
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be as intrusive and unreliable as the stringent requirements and
prying interrogatories that are routinely imposed by state agencies
that supervise adoption and foster care. Moreover, the remedies
for abuse and neglect after the fact remain, just as they do for other
children, where they can exercise a deterrent effect that is no
smaller than it is for other parents. More importantly, perhaps, the
availability of these contracts underscores the point that the surrogacy contract is not the sale of a child, in the sense that a sack of
potatoes is sold. The mere existence of a child confers rights
against its natural parents; those obligations are retained as a matter of course by the natural father and assumed as part of the adoption process by his wife. It would be grotesque to claim that the
child is placed at increased risk by the release of maternal rights by
the surrogate or the assumption of these obligations by the adopting mother. The legal obligations to the child survive the surrogacy
contract and offer protection that is every bit as strong, and probably less needed, than similar rights against natural parents.
It could, of course, be argued that the introduction of a new child
into the family could have effects on other children of the marriage. But again the argument falls far short of what is required to
establish the case for a ban, or indeed any anticipatory restrictions,
on surrogacy. Many of these same problems arise when a new
child is born into a stable family, or when an adoptive or foster
child is introduced into a family with other children, either born of
the marriage or adopted. In all these countless cases, a little foresight, patience and understanding go much further than a cold or
impersonal set of legal rules. These dislocations are likely to be
small; and often the interaction with a second child will be a positive experience for the existing children of the marriage. To use
this issue as a reason to prevent surrogacy contracts is to grasp at
straws. Well-functioning families negotiate greater dislocations
year in and year out.
As a variation on this theme, it seems a mistake to suggest, as
Ahderson does, that all children will be subject to increased fears
that they will be alienated by their parents, and thus cease to be
objects of love and affection. 28 Surrogacy contracts only contemplate the transfer of newborn infants, not of older children who
28 Anderson, supra note 7, at 172.
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have already formed, emotional attachments to their parents.
When changes in parental rights or custody of older children are
required their preferences have to be taken into account, even if
they are not given decisive weight. The same considerations apply
when the parents of surrogate children seek to relinquish custody
or control. While that situation is of genuine concern, it must be
remembered that these transfers can only be made on the same
terms and conditions that transfers of one's own children are
allowed. At this point, the interests of the child clearly do (and
should) limit the freedom to assign parental rights and control.
Nothing in surrogacy agreements or surrogacy practices undermines that set of expectations.
The second form of externality is different in its scope and
dimension. Here the argument is that the surrogacy contract has
negative impact on the social status and psychological self-definition of women as a class, and should for that reasoil be banned and
prohibited. But this class of externalities again is entitled to no
weight. Indeed there is a great intellectual vice in making any legal
rule turn on what might be termed soft, selective, negative externalities. A word of explanation seems in order about this mouthful.
The first part of the expression is designed to indicate that the
externality in question does not fall into the first two categories of
external harm: (a) physical injury to person or property, which for
these purposes can be defined to include the threat thereof, as in
the case of assault or intentional infliction of emotional distress by
extreme and outrageous conduct; or (b) economic harm brought
on by certain market practices that allow the creation or exploitation of monopoly power. Neither of these durable cases of externality are present. Only the symbolic effects of the transaction can
be used to throw doubt on its social desirability.
It is important to note the weaknesses of any position that
attaches such great weight to these soft externalities. First, this
class of soft externalities is not limited to the negative responses
that some persons have toward the practice of paid surrogacy.
Externalities, as noted above, come in both positive and negative
forms, and soft positive externalities are as important as soft negative ones. It may well be that some academic feminists and their
supporters believe that the indirect social effects of surrogate concepts lead to the loss of self-respect to women, the disintegration of
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the family, and the loss of sensitivity attendant to the commercialization of transactions. But these critics are scarcely a random draw
from the population: other women and men might well disagree.
So let me add my own sentiments to the register on the assumption that they count no more, but no less, than anyone else's: surrogacy is an affirmation of family values (which I applaud), and one
which allows for the continuation of family ties across the generations. Their commercial aspects are a regrettable but necessary
part of transactions that yield enormous nonquantifiable benefits
to the biological father and his wife, and to their friends and family
who have comforted them during their years of anxiety and distress. The ability of individuals to handle these transactions with
sensitivity and discretion is not precluded because money changes
hands. Indeed the success of the venture may be aided if the
money allows skilled professionals to ease the transition of both
sides. I am far from saying that these sentiments should persuade
the ardent opponent of surrogacy that the rest of us gain tangibly
from allowing these contracts to go forward. But it is a misguided
truncation of the social welfare calculation to ignore the positive
sentiments that develop around a particular institution because
other individuals hold a strong but abstract conviction that the
transaction should be banned altogether.
The full sum of these soft externalities may be negative, assuming that the difficult aggregation of sentiments can be made across
parties. But I would be loath to use this possible balance of negative sentiments to justify any intervention, given the palpable gains
from trade to the parties. Nor are the difficulties in summing preferences confined to the question of surrogacy. There are other
areas in family law where controversy abounds. Many people find
interracial marriage offensive, yet that is hardly a reason to have
anti-miscegenation laws on the books. Likewise same-sex marriages are the source of profound discomfort and opposition. But
while individuals who do not believe in the practice need not
attend the celebrations, their resentment is hardly a reason to ban
the practice. 29 In all these cases we are far better off with one uniform principle*than with an endless series of ad hoc and case-by29 For my own views on same-sex marriages, see Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil
Rights Laws: From Jim Crow to Same-Sex Marriages, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2456 (1994).
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case decisions. The proper rule of decision is to ignore the offense
that people take at the conduct of others, just as we ignore the
positive sentiments that some people have about the actions of
others. We should allow the gains to the parties to legitimize the
transaction. The selective invocation of some soft external effects
is far riskier than ignoring these sentiments on the ground that the
opposite points of view largely cancel each other out. John Stuart
Mill's classic statement that the sole justification for restricting
individual liberty is the prevention of harm to others is wholly gutted if the conception of harm is given a meaning as broad as that
supposed in this context.30 Hard externalities count, and should be
assessed on an individualized basis so that the proper mix of remedies, whether by way of damages or injunctions, can be imposed.
Soft externalities should always be ignored.
II.

DUBIOUS GROUNDS TO DENY CONTRACTUAL
ENFORCEMENT

Although the opponents of surrogacy contracts address issues
of contract formation and externalities, they do not confine their
objections to these traditional grounds. In addition, to justify their
result they put forward an array of additional considerations that
are more difficult to categorize. In this Part I shall confront several
of these concerns: commodification, subordination, and
incommensurability.
A.

Commodification

The question of soft externalities, far from being ignored, is
often pursued under the rubric of commodification. Thus we are
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with
him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting
him with any evil in case he do otherwise.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, reprintedin Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government 81, 95-96 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951) (1859).
30
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told that the surrogate relationship is improper because it commodifies women, their labor and their offspring. 31 Yet once again
the argument seems fatally flawed for two interconnected reasons.
The first point is obvious: there is no compulsion for any couple or
any woman to enter into this market. Those infertile couples who
choose not to pursue surrogacy, or indeed not to pursue adoption,
are perfectly within their rights. They have not sought to become
buyers in this new market. And the vast majority of women who
choose not to become surrogates are also within their rights. The
claim about commodification therefore has nothing whatsoever to
do with what a woman may or not do with her own body, or what a
man may or may not do with his own sperm. Instead it is an effort
by some to impose their own conception of the right and proper
thing to do with bodies, eggs and sperm on other individuals who
hew to different conceptions of the good. In order to restrain the
behavior of others, some greater warrant than a diffuse condemnation of their conduct is needed, and that requirement forces the
inquiry back to the discussion of defects in the contracting process
and negative third party effects, both of which have already been
found wanting. No one's views on commodification should be
imposed on other individuals who do not share those views. The
women who want to enter into surrogacy contracts are not reduced
to commodities solely because others mistakenly hold to that view.
The second reason for rejecting the commodification argument is
related to the first. The word "'commodification" builds on the
word "commodity," and thus skillfully exploits an avoidable ambiguity in the English language. In one sense "commodity" has a
very broad meaning: it can cover "something that can be bought
and sold," or "a movable article of trade or convenience. ' 32 To use
this definition of a commodity is to equate it with the full domain
of items of economic or exchange value (excluding land). But
when one talks about things that are traded over the commodity
31 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 7, at 168-75; Radin, supra note 12, at 1855-56, 1928-36;
Field, supra note 8, at 28 (quoting Barbara K. Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy 2 (1986))
("When we talk about the buying and selling of blood, the banking of sperm, the costs of
hiring a surrogate mother, we are talking about bodies as commodities.... The new
technology of reproduction is building on this commodification.").
32 See Funk & Wagnalls New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English
Language 264 (1982).
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exchange, a narrower definition is employed, one which stresses
the fungible nature of the goods in question. And "fungible," we
are told by the U.C.C., refers to goods "of which any unit is, by
'33
nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other like unit.
In this definition the U.C.C. quite consciously brackets fungible
goods with "securities," all of which are of the same group or class.
The key element of a commodity in this account is the perfect substitutability of one unit for another, from which it is easily inferred
that there is no special subjective value that is attached to any particular unit. The ownership of any distinctive good, from a favorite
photograph to an old pair of shoes, is not by this definition a commodity because that condition of perfect substitutability is lacking:
the presence of subjective value precludes any thing from becoming a commodity in this sense. Indeed when a specially valued person or thing is called a "rare commodity" the use of the adjective
"rare" is meant to distinguish the particular subject matter from
fungible commodities. Commodities in the narrower sense are, of
course, of enormous value because the ability to substitute reduces
the cost and increases the velocity of trade, for all concerned. But
surrogacy contracts are for the duration, not for resale.
There is a second sense in which commodities differ from ordinary goods: goods may be, and often are, durable. Commodities
are typically meant for consumption, either in their original form
or after they have been converted into other consumable products:
grapes into wine, cattle into steaks, iron into cars, and the like. To
place the label "commodity" on any good therefore means that it
has no unique subjective value and is likely to be quickly transformed or consumed. To commodify something that is not a standard commodity makes it appear, wrongly, that this good, service or
relationship lacks any distinctive value and will in any event
quickly be consumed or transformed. It connotes the sale of cattle
being led to the slaughter for the benefit of their owners. That
term is wholly inappropriate to describe the relationship of an artist to a picture, a doctor to a patient, or a parent to a child.
This linguistic analysis shows how inappropriate it is to apply the
term "commodification" in the surrogate setting. No one wants to
"commodify" children in ways that treat them as fungible goods to
33 U.C.C. § 1-201(17) (1990).
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be sold and consumed in the ordinary course of business. The law
of contract may specify a uniform way of making agreements for
the transfer of anything-the rules of offer and acceptance, consideration, and the like do apply to all contracts. But no one should
be misled by' the universality of the contractual form in the face of
the diversity of the contractual subject matter. It is very clear that
the same terms can be used to buy and sell, transfer and assign,
very different objects or rights in very different ways.
Surrogacy contracts should stand and fall on their own merits.
These are not contracts for the sale or repair of goods. They are
contracts for the release of parental rights and obligations, specially tailored to the situation that they address. 34 No participant in
the surrogacy contract would describe the newborn child as a
"commodity" in the narrower sense of that term. It is therefore no
wonder that the mischievous phrase "commodification" is only
used as a form of descriptive rebuke by those who attack the transaction, not by those who participate in it.
B. Gender Subordination
Another common theme is that of gender subordination. The
argument proceeds that women cannot be expected to fend for
themselves because of their inferior position and economic power
in society at large. Thus Margaret Radin writes that "paid surrogacy within the current gender structure may symbolize that
women are fungible baby-makers for men whose seed must be carried on."35 Similarly Debra Satz writes that "it is the background
gender inequality that makes the cOmmodification of women's and
children's attributes especially objectionable." Her explanation:
these power differentials turn "women's labor into something that
is used and controlled by others."36
The argument here in part reflects the misguided use of the commodity analogies already addressed, but raises the distinct element
of inequality of bargaining power based on background conditions.
This argument assumes without demonstration the level of domi34 On the content of these terms, see infra Part IV.
35 Radin, supra note 12, at 1935. The term "fungible" again presses the misleading
analogy of children to commodities.
36 Debra Satz, Markets in Women's Reproductive Labor, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 12324 (1992).
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nance that it claims, without any identification of the institutional
features that lead to its perpetuation in all areas of social life. In
addition, it ignores the obvious point that the interests of women
and children lie on both sides of these transactions. Nor is it
explained how far this argument goes. Conditions of gender inequality, to the extent that they exist, are all-pervasive in society and
surely are not confined to this narrow set of transactions. How far
then does the prohibition run? Are women to be prevented from
ever working for men? From having men work for them? The
whole point seems so loose and abstract, for it challenges the very
idea that women can be autonomous individuals capable of legal
respect. It is difficult to see how a claim that sweeping bears any
relevance at all to the question of surrogacy contracts.
C. Incommensurability
Discussions of commodification typically carry in their wake yet
37
another obstacle to voluntary exchange: incommensurability.
Here the basic idea is that no common metric (much less one
dependent on utility) can capture that which is relevant and distinctive about persons or experiences. Love of course cannot be
bought and sold for dollars, and we do not know how to put a price
on it. But once again the point seems to be a giant non sequitur.
In those cases where monetary values cannot be put on arrangements, we should not expect to see cash involved in those relationships. Since the Beatles reminded us that "money can't buy you
love," we would not expect to see loving arrangements arise in
which sums of money are paid for each act of companionship and
gratification. But from that premise it hardly follows that transactions that do have a cash component should be banned. If a
37 For my more extensive critique of the idea of incommensurability generally, see
Richard A. Epstein, Incommensurability of Values: Or Is Utility the Ruler of the World?,
1996 Utah L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
For leading expositions of the incommensurability position, see, e.g., Joseph Raz, The
Morality of Freedom 321-66 (1986); Anderson, supra note 7, at 177-79; Radin, supra note
12, at 1924-30; Margaret J. Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in Markets and Justice
165 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989); Margaret J. Radin,
Compensation and Commensurability, 43 Duke L.J. 56 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779 (1994).
For a defense of commensurability, see James Griffin, Are There Incommensurable
Values?, 7 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 39 (1977).
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woman wishes to serve as a surrogate for reasons of love (as when
one woman carries the child of her sister to term), that relationship
should be evaluated on its own terms. If another woman receives
$10,000 to serve as surrogate, which she uses to take care of her
own children, that is a different kind of relationship to be sure. Yet
it sounds hollow for a third party to insist that no monetary value
can be assigned to this relationship when the contract in question
has already specified a price for the services to be rendered.
As an abstract matter we may wonder how we, or anyone else,
weigh the intangibles associated with choosing a career, getting
married, having children, migrating to a new country and the like.
But our sense of abstract wonderment hardly justifies banning any
of these transactions or decisions. Instead, the more sensible
approach to the subject is to recognize that trade-offs are invariably subjective. The differences in subjective valuation lead to
diversity of viewpoints and activities, and that diversity in turn
enriches our overall culture. Intelligent people can overcome the
obstacles to sound decisionmaking that block their path. When
they have made up their minds, their evaluation should be final.
Incommensurability, then, may pose a complex philosophical problem, but, like appeals to the idea of commodification, it neither
advances nor retards a case for government intervention in voluntary transactions. The key questions are always and only: were
there defects in the contracting process, and were there net negative hard externalities? Otherwise we all have to learn to live with
transactions and behaviors of which we disapprove and to grow
stronger in our frustration and uneasiness.
III.

THE COMPARISON WITH BABY-SELLING

Thus far I have confined my analysis to surrogacy transactions
on the assumption that they are sui generi.s. But in some sense
they are not. In particular, the release of parental rights by the
biological mother, followed by the assumption of parental rights by
the adoptive mother, could be compressed into a single transaction;
the sale of a half-interest in a baby. The condemnation of any
transaction as "baby-selling" is all too often treated as a conversation stopper, so that the only question left to ask is whether the
preservation of the father's interest in the transaction sufficiently
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distinguishes surrogacy from baby-selling transactions between
total strangers.
My own answer to that question is twofold. The first part is that
the distinctions are small, but not unimportant. With surrogacy the
father receives exclusive custody (with his wife) over his own child
so that the baby has strong biological ties in its new environment.
The second part is that the ban on baby-selling is misguided for the
same reason that any total ban on surrogacy contracts would be
misguided: none of the impediments to contract outweighs the
gains from, trade. With a respectful nod to those who have taken
this path before me,38 it is instructive to critique the arguments now
regarded as strong enough to condemn baby-selling as illegal in
every state of the Union. 9 Consider the case for illegality offered
by Judge Wilentz of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Baby
0
M:

4

The prohibition of our statute is strong. Violation constitutes a
high misdemeanor, a third-degree crime, carrying a penalty of
three to five years imprisonment. The evils inherent in baby-bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons. The child is sold
without regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable parents.
The natural mother does not receive the benefit of counseling and
guidance to assist her in making a decision that may affect her for a
lifetime. In fact, the monetary incentive to sell her child may,
depending on her financial circumstances, make her decision less
voluntary. Furthermore, the adoptive parents may not be fully
informed of the natural parents' medical history.
Baby-selling potentially results in the exploitation of all parties
involved. Conversely, adoption statutes seek to further humanitarian goals, foremost among them the best interests of the child.4
The intensity of this denunciation belies the weakness of its arguments. Take the points in order. The first objection is that the
38 For the most systematic defense of baby-selling, see Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1978). For criticism,
see J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. Toronto L.J. 341 (1984).
39 See Field, supra note 8, at 17. Field cites Senate Hearings of a generation ago which
concluded that the practice of baby-selling was widespread. See Juvenile Delinquency
(Interstate Adoption Practices): Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
40 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
41 Id. at 1241-42 (citations omitted).
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mother (or parental couple) will not take care to see that the child
is sold to suitable parents. But there is little reason to believe that
the decision to sell her parental rights to a child leaves the mother
indifferent to the identity of the buyer. What evidence we have
from the operation of the gray market (where fees go to the brokers, lawyers and doctors who handle these transactions, and to the
(inflated) medical expenses of the mother) suggests quite the opposite. These transactions do not betray any indifference on the part
of the women who part with their babies. The common practice is
for potential adoptive couples to prepare r6sum6s indicating why
they are suitable, and for extensive interviews to take place on
both sides, to see if the baby is suitable for adoption and whether
the adoptive couple is suitable to take it. There is little reason to
believe that the information generated by this process is inferior to
that which is required in adoptions supervised by public agencies,
where bureaucratic imperatives can more easily intervene.
The second argument put forth in Baby M, that counseling and
guidance should be provided, does nothing to support a ban, but
only justifies, at most, a requirement that such counseling take
place before the transaction is completed. Yet ironically, counseling and guidance would be more accessible and more affordable if
the ban were removed, for then people could offer their services
without running the risk of being branded as criminal accomplices.
One final twist is that the demand for counseling once again
reveals the strange bedfellows that arise in family law matters.
When the issue is abortion, the pro-life groups support counseling
as a way to slow down the process; the pro-choice groups vigorously oppose this alternative, and have for the most part been successful in defending the proposition that counseling "burdens" the
abortion right. But with surrogacy, the pro-life forces (which tend
to be more conservative than libertarian) often join forces with
many pro-choice groups to use counseling requirements as a means
to curtail the number of surrogacy transactions. But the shifting
coalitions cannot conceal one odd point about the debate: the
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adverse psychological consequences of an abortion can be far
greater than those of participating in a surrogacy transaction.42
Nor is the court in Baby M correct to say that the transfer of
money negates the voluntary nature of the transaction. Money
only converts the transaction from a voluntary donation of parental
rights to a sale of parental rights. It does not make the transaction
corrupt; it does not carry with it the conclusive mark of fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation, which cannot be inferred from the
payment of money in this context any more than it can in any
other. The most that can be said is that the money may create
some kind of conflict of interest between parent and child, so that
the sale will be made to a higher bidder when the child is better off
in the care of a lower bidder. Yet once again the decisions made in
the gray market suggest that this concern is overblown. The
mother who surrenders custody of her child will have to weigh one
interest against another, just as she does when she keeps custody of
the child and has to decide whether she can afford to send the child
to day-care or private school. The problem of conflicts of interest
is one that a sensible system of counseling might address, but
except in extreme cases, it hardly seems to be a reason to ban the
transaction. State-run adoption systems are rife with conflicts of
interest and incompetence, yet the response is not to ban their
operation entirely.
Finally, medical history is hardly a dispositive concern. A simple
rule-which should be desired by the parties in any event-could
require the natural parents to give their medical histories in confidence should they be needed for diagnosis or treatment. There is
nothing in these slight procedural difficulties that comes close to
justifying the ban.
For the rest, the arguments about baby-selling only track those
for surrogate mothers. There are concerns about protection of the
baby against abuse by the new parents. But is it more likely that
these parents will abuse children than, say, the new live-in boyfriend of the mother of an illegitimate child? And the sanctions
against abuse and neglect remain on the new parents as they did on
42 For an account of the psychological difficulties with abortion, see Michael W.
McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1181 (1991) (reviewing Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (1990)).
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the old. One can find cases in which ostensible sales seem abusive
per se, as with the couple who wanted to trade their baby for an
$8,800 Corvette.43 Yet oddly enough, the baby may well have been
better off if sold than if retained, and the father was surely guilty of
abuse for proposing the transaction in this form. Likewise it makes
no sense to allow babies to be used as security for an unpaid debt,
for that hostage transaction hardly comports with the best interests
of the child. But the use of these extreme examples should not
discredit the general practice in its far more benign form. And the
concerns of commodification and incommensurability are no more
persuasive here than with surrogacy. The analogy to baby-selling,
then, only strengthens the conclusion that surrogacy transactions
should be legal.
IV.

ENFORCEABILrTY OF THE SURROGACY CONTRACT

We come at last to the question of the enforcement of the surrogacy contract. Here there are two issues that must be addressed.
The first one is a continuation of the attack on surrogacy contracts
based on the terms that they contain. Elizabeth Anderson, for
example, notes that the standard surrogacy contract requires the
surrogate mother
to obey all doctor's orders' made in the interests of the child's
health. These orders could include forcing her to give up her job,
travel plans, and recreational activities. The doctor could confine
her to bed, regulate her diet rigidly, and order her to submit to
surgery and to take drugs.'
These are indeed very severe restrictions, but the explanation for
them is not hard to come by. The surrogate mother has only a
short-term interest in the child. The father has a permanent one.
43 See Radin, supra note 12, at 1925-28. She quotes from Lewis Hyde, The Gift:
Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property (1983) as follows:
In 1980 a New Jersey couple tried to exchange their baby for a secondhand
Corvette worth $8,800. The used-car dealer (who had been tempted into the deal
after the loss of his own family in a fire) later told the newspapers why he changed
his mind: "My first impression was to swap the car for the kid. I knew moments
later that it would be wrong-not so much wrong for me or the expense of it, but
what would this baby do when he's not a baby anymore? How could this boy cope
with life knowing he was traded for a car?"
Id. at 96 (quoted in Radin, supra note 12, at 1926 n.267).
44 Anderson, supra note 7, at 176 (citations omitted).
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While there is a substantial correspondence of interest, there is also
a potential conflict of interest between surrogate mother and child
(especially as the surrogacy contract is designed to discourage the
development of affective relationships between surrogate and
child), and something has to be done to fill that gap. The right
approach therefore is to devise a contractual scheme that seeks at
reasonable cost to eliminate that conflict of interest without
allowing the father to dominate the life of the surrogate mother.
The introduction of a physician into the picture creates a thirdparty buffer, and the restrictions that are imposed here are in practice no different from those which would ordinarily be required of
a mother who wanted to carry a child to term when no surrogacy
arrangement was involved. Even the requirement of surgery is
hardly one to attract condemnation, for it could be that a caesarian
section is necessary for the delivery of the child. To be sure, the
surrogate mother has to surrender some degree of freedom which
would otherwise be hers. But the terms of the contract are born of
the occasion, and the friction that they create is thought justified by
the promise of greater gains. For some women these conditions
are so onerous that they would not enter into the transaction at all.
But for others the cost of these additional restrictions is perceived
as being far lower. To argue that these contractual terms are inconsistent with the autonomy of the surrogate mother is to miss the
function of all contractual arrangements over labor. Full control
over their own bodies and labor is what autonomous individuals
have before they contract. The process of contracting always
requires a surrender of some portion of autonomy, but only in
exchange for things that are thought to be more valuable.
A more difficult term in the surrogacy contract is that which
allows (presumably in the cases where the infant is found to be
seriously defective) the father to order an abortion to terminate
the pregnancy. One possible response is that the woman would
refuse to accept this particular term, at which point someone has to
decide who has custodial obligations to the child when it is born.
Yet if this term is included in the surrogacy contract, we should
all be of two minds on the question because of the underlying
ambiguity that surrounds abortion in ordinary contexts. Thus I
find the question of whether abortion should be legal a difficult
issue, to say the least, given that the harm to the fetus is one that
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cannot be ignored in any social calculation, and may well deserve a
dominant position in the overall judgment. If abortion were illegal,
even in cases when the unborn child suffered serious birth defects
it is clear that a clause of this sort could not be inserted into any
surrogacy contract. The surrogacy arrangement does not remove
any of the legal restrictions on pregnancy that exist for ordinary
married couples. If they were required to carry a child to term,
then so too the surrogate. Similarly, if the father would have
parental obligations to a child carried by his wife, then he would
have similar obligations to the surrogate. There would be an unexceptionable justification for a restriction on contractual freedom.
Yet so long as the law is otherwise on the question of abortion,
so long as Roe v. Wade45 is the law, then it should be otherwise in
this context as well. It is the father who has, under contract, the
longterm obligations for the child, and it cannot be regarded as
unjust or unwise that his decision should determine whether the
abortion should take place for precisely those reasons that are so
important to ordinary married couples. Indeed it would be quite
extraordinary if any contract would allow the separation between
risk and reward that is created by allowing the surrogate to carry
the baby to term when the obligations of care devolve thereafter
on the father. One can imagine a situation where the converse is
true, so that the surrogate could terminate the pregnancy when the
father wishes for it to continue: such an outcome might happen if
the surrogate faces some medical risk from the pregnancy. But
allowing the surrogate to carry the child to term against the wishes
of its father is inconsistent with the basic contractual design.
There is still one last issue of great importance in these contracts:
whether the father is entitled to specific performance over all of
the terms. As has been noted by Debra Satz, in the ordinary contract a default by the promisor results not in specific performance
of the service obligation, but in an action for damages. "Thus, by
analogy, if the woman in a pregnancy contract defaults on her
agreement and decides to keep the child, the other parties should
not be able to demand performance (that is, surrender of the
child); rather, they can demand monetary compensation." 46 In this
45 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46

Satz, supra note 36, at 126.
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context, moreover, the suggestion about monetary compensation
may be academic: the surrogate mother may not have the resources
to pay any compensation, which would be difficult to determine in
any event. And even if such compensation could be set and paid, it
would leave the biological father and his wife far short of what they
sought to achieve from this agreement.
To see the error in Satz's suggestion, it is necessary to begin with
the observation that specific performance as a remedy is-ironically-unnecessary in those cases where the contract in question
calls for the sale of a fungible commodity that can be covered in
the market. 47 In cases involving the sale of land, which is generally
regarded as "unique," and certain specialized goods, the remedy of
specific performance is routinely awarded. One reason is the difficulty of finding a sum of money that will leave the buyer indifferent
between the goods promised and their money substitute.
A second reason is that the specific performance of transfers,
unlike that of employment contracts, does not require constant
judicial supervision. In this connection denying the specific performance remedy still leaves the biological father with parental
obligations that require greater supervision than the transfer of the
child at birth. And even if the law were prepared to allow the surrogate to cancel the contract only if she assumed all parental obligations, the problem would not would be solved: the father would
still be required to abandon all parental rights, and to sever all connections with his own biological child. Yet the remaining obligations on the surrogate mother (such as those to supply medical
information when necessary) are surely easier to supervise than a
full-blown custodial arrangement. Once therefore it is realized
that surrogacy contracts are not transactions for the sale of commodities, it should be painfully clear that damages at law are not an
adequate remedy, and that specific performance is needed.
In similar fashion, the standard surrogacy contract offers its own
response to any incommensurability concern. In the abstract it is
hard to determine whether the surrogate mother or the biological
father has a greater interest in the child. But the genius of contract
47 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-712 (1990), in which the buyer's remedy is to "cover" for the
nondelivery of goods. Obviously the condition will only work where the goods are
fungible.
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is to take this decision out of the public realm and to allow the
parties to decide the issue for themselves. If specific performance
is called for, then there has been a prior mutual evaluation as to
who should have custody of the child, and there exists no reason
for any court to reverse that judgment by refusing to enforce the
contract as written.
Lest there be any uncertainty about this conclusion, consider
what happens when the transaction is examined from the other
side. Suppose that the father decides that he no longer wants the
child after birth. The right response is "too late, so sorry." The
surrogate mother cannot be forced to retain the child, even if she is
provided with an action in damages or child support against the
wayward father. Nor should she be required to bear the expense
and the worry of putting the child out for adoption when the biological father still has some rights and obligations for the child.
Just as the sellers of land can get specific performance from their
buyers, so too the surrogate mother should be entitled to it unless
the contract provides otherwise. That last caveat shows what is
fundamentally wrong with Satz's suggestion. The choice of remedies should normally be left to the parties, not subject to direct
control by the state. If the parties think that specific performance
is the appropriate remedy, then that should conclude the matter
unless there is some third-party claim at stake. That last qualification in turn brings us back to the question of externalities and
third-party effects, which has been addressed once and need not be
addressed again.
This discussion of specific performance is important because it
shows the weakness in the compromise position which holds that
surrogacy contracts should be neither criminal nor enforceable (at
least at the option of the father). Martha Field urges courts to treat
the contracts as valid but unenforceable at the option of the biological mother, but not the biological father. 48 Her position is
designed to allow the biological mother the best of both worlds
under the surrogacy contract: she can keep the baby if she wants,
or let it go if she prefers the bargain. Her only constraint is that
she must make a once-and-for-all-choice, typically going through
with the original plans, as some ninety-nine percent of surrogate
48

See Field, supra note 8, at 75-83, 97-109.
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mothers have done.49 Field's solution has the obvious virtue of
seeking some golden mean between total enforcement and complete illegality, but her compromise is more elegant than sound.
The key objection to Field's proposal is that it overlooks one of
the major functions of the contracting process-to sort out the parties who choose to participate in the venture in the first place. That
issue is of little concern with commodity contracts, where one
buyer is just as good as another for number two wheat. But precisely because surrogacy contracts are not contracts for commodities, 'we need a legal regime where surrogacy contracts will be
enforced come hell or high water. Once the legal regime is unmistakably clear, then any woman with doubts about her psychological
willingness to part with her child will steer away from it. She
knows that she will be denied the luxury of the wait-and-see option
later on. But once surrogacy contracts are rendered unenforceable, two important changes will happen. First, women who were
once committed to letting go of the child at birth have the luxuly of
second thoughts. Second, women who are not quite sure what they
will do at childbirth will be more willing to participate in surrogacy
transactions. Two advantages of the firm contract are therefore
lost. First, it no longer functions as a safeguard against psychological regret. Second, it strips away from the biological father and his
wife an essential sorting device for selecting the right surrogate
mother.
The composition of the pool of women who will contemplate
surrogacy will change, and change for the worse. Now women who
are uncertain as to what they will do could enter the bidding, since
the biological father and his wife are stripped of any contractual
sorting device. Without the firm contract, greater reliance would
be placed on psychological testing, thus adding expense to the process and possibly deterring willing surrogates who knew their own
preferences and were comfortable with the older, leaner process.
The upshot is that the rate of withdrawal would increase, and if it
went even from one to three percent it could have enormous
impact on the willingness of couples to enter surrogacy contracts.
Small risks are often difficult to calculate, and the resultant uncer49 The empirical figure cited by Field is 495 out of 500 successful contracts. See id. at
184 n.16.
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tainty can undermine the fragile resolve to enter into such a
transaction.
To be sure, the wait-and-see option is not always bad. When a
married couple wishes to adopt a child outside of surrogacy, this
arrangement is often used: the birth mother can change her mind
up to the last moment. But if she does, all that happens (in addition to the psychological pain and investment by the adopting parents) is that she keeps her own child. With surrogacy the failure of
the contract does not spell the end of the relationship, for the biological father still shoulders parental obligations. Instead of a clean
contract, an ugly fight over custody and support looms on the horizon. Given this risky prospect, many couples wanting surrogacy
may decide not to go ahead. The intermediate solution therefore
will undermine the market, and for what?5" The needs of the natural father and his adopting spouse are palpable. Yet the risks
attributed to baby-selling by Judge Wilentz in Baby M simply are
not present at all. Why surrogacy contracts should not be a source
of hope and affirmation remains something of a mystery to me.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Article has been to review the arguments
that can be made over the proper social response to surrogacy contracts. The most important methodological point is to recognize
that new technologies and new contracts do not require abandoning the standard techniques for evaluating the efficiency of various social arrangements. Surrogacy contracts, are no exception to
50 Custody fights of this sort are avoided when the transaction is a true womb-rental
situation. And there have been as of late some advertisements placed in college
newspapers in the Northeast offering to pay money to college students for eggs that can be
fertilized by a biological father and then implanted into his wife's womb. See Karen S.
Peterson, Ads for Egg Donors Raise Ethical Ire, USA Today, Feb. 7, 1995, at 1D
(reporting an ad reading: "Donor sought: empathetic, intelligent, healthy, attractive
(preferably dark-haired/Jewish) woman 21-28."). The payment offered was $2,000 plus a
free medical examination. A sidebar to the article noted that the use of fertility drugs,
characteristic among egg donors, could raise the risk of ovarian cancer. See Tim Friend,
Giving Could Raise Cancer Risk, USA Today, Feb. 7, 1995, at 1D. These transactions
require the surrogate to undergo extensive drug treatment to produce a suitable yield of
harvestable eggs, and clearly demand a level of technical medical sophistication not
required in simple surrogacy transactions. But they do avoid the problem of enforcement
when the wife gives birth to the surrogate's child. It is an open question whether these
transactions have a future in an unregulated market.
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this rule. The technology needed for surrogacy arrangements is not
sophisticated or obscure. The desire for these contracts is palpable;
people enter into them. As a general rule the law follows the right
course when it enforces serious promises unless there is a good reason not to do so. In general these good reasons fall into two
classes: defects in the contracting process or adverse effects on
third parties. Both of these issues may surely be raised in this context, but neither of them is persuasive if we confine our concern to
such matters as duress or misrepresentation on contracting, or the
imposition of serious harms on third parties.
Unfortunately the history of contract law does not always remain
within these well-charted paths. Side by side with this approach,
there is a long history to disrupt the system of contractual enforcement by appeals to such notions as exploitation and unequal
bargaining power. Today a fresh set of concerns is tied to commodification, incommensurability and gender inequality. Yet no
matter how insistent and ubiquitous these claims, they do not offer
sufficient reason to block the enforcement of contracts simply
because people disapprove of the motives and actions of the parties to those arrangements. Tested against any general theory of
contractual obligations, surrogacy contracts may be complex and
difficult arrangements, as befits the powerful emotions tied to their
subject matter. But they are also contracts deserving of full legal
enforcement, which they are unfortunately too often denied.
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